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ADMISSION TO FEDERAL COURTS
committee but also to policemen, firemen, applicants to the bar, and
others who appear before investigatory committees.
Although many undoubtedly disfavor the Spevack approach in
the expansion of due process because of conflicting interests, it
seems reasonable to assume that, in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions, the Court will continue to make fully meaningful those
individual rights granted by the Constitution.
WLIAM J. DAvis
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT - ADMISSION OF
NONRESIDENTS - FEDERAL COURTS
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1966).
Because of the growing complexity of the law, attorneys who
specialize in narrow areas of litigation have increasingly been called
upon to conduct litigation in a number of states; consequently, prob-
lems arise regarding admission to practice. One question relates to
whether, in light of the Erie doctrine,' an out-of-state attorney may
be permitted to practice in a federal court situated in a state which
has a strong policy against permitting practice by attorneys who
have not been licensed locally.
Historically, admission of attorneys to practice was controlled
through the rule-making power of each court,' a practice which is
still followed in the federal system. By virtue of their power to
enact rules governing practice, the federal courts have generally as-
sumed the authority to admit out-of-state attorneys regardless of lo-
cal policy.4 Typically, a district court's rules provide that an out-of-
state attorney may participate in a particular case through special
'The doctrine embodies more than the mandates of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). See generally WiGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 59 (1963).
2 State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 232, 140 A.2d
863, 869 (1958); POUND, THE IAwYER FRoM ANTIQuITY To MODER- TMs 100
(1953).
SFED. R. Civ. P. 83.
4 Several district courts grant general admission to other than those admitted to the
state bar of the district. See, e.g., D. CONN. R. 2(a); N.D. ILL. P. 6(a); S.D. IND. 1t
1(b); D. MID. R- 2; D. MASS. R. 2. Those with more restrictive admission poliies gen-
erally provide for spedal admission. See, e.g., D. KAN. R. 3(f); E.D. MICH. R. 1(2);
W.D. TENN. R. 1(b).
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admission. This generally requires that he associate himself with a
local counsel who is an attorney of record in the case5 and that the
local counsel file a motion stating that the applicant is admitted to
the courts of his home state or to some United States court.' How-
ever, the rules among the district courts are not uniform,7 and some
courts have no rules whatsoever.8
Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp.,9 a recent New York federal
case, brought to light a deficiency in the procedure for special ad-
mission. The defendant, president of a New York movie theater
corporation which was bringing an antitrust suit against several
major movie producers, sought the aid of the plaintiff, a California
attorney who had earned a reputation as an expert in the field of
movie industry antitrust litigation." After some persuasion by the
defendant, the plaintiff associated himself with one of the defend-
ant's New York lawyers.'1 After several years the local attorney
with whom plaintiff had associated himself withdrew from the case,
and subsequently the plaintiff's activities diminished greatly al-
though the defendant never discharged him. 2 After the defend-
ant's attorneys eventually negotiated a settlement, the plaintiff re-
quested payment of his contingency fee,'3 but the defendant refused
to pay and discharged him.' The plaintiff subsequently filed a
diversity suit in New York federal district court to recover his fee
in quantum meruit, 5 even though he at no time had sought special
admission to the New York district court. 6
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (2) and 11 jointly provide that only an attorney of record may
file motions in an action. Thus, in order to validate his status, an out-of-state attorney
must rely upon the local counsel to act.
6 See, e.g., N.D. GA. R. 1(d); W.D. KY. R. 2(b), (c); D. MONT. R. I(c).
7 Application of Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213, 215 (9th Cir. 1956); Crotty, Require-
ments for Admission To Practice in the Federal Courts, in BAR EXAMINATIONS AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 123 (1952); Williamson, A Curious
Checkerboard: Disparate Rules of Admission in Federal Courts, 42 A.B.A.J. 720 (1956).
The disparity is demonstrated in material quoted note 34 infra.
8 For examples, see FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES xi-xiv, contained in FED. RULES
SERV. (1964).
9 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1966).
'lId. at 163.
"1 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
'4 Ibid.
15 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 364
F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3210 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1966).
16 364 F.2d at 164.
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That court was faced with New York's strong statutory policy
against permitting any practice by attorneys not admitted to the
state courts." The lower court decided, however, that the plaintiff's
activities were "isolated incidents"'" rather than the practice of law
and, in rendering judgment for the plaintiff, 9 held that such inci-
dents were excepted from the statute by the recent New York case
of Spivak v. Sachs.2" In the alternative, the lower court held that
the statute was inapplicable to an attorney working on a matter of
federal law to be tried in federal court.21
The defendant appealed, and because in the interim the New
York Court of Appeals had overturned22 the Spivak case, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed" but granted the re-
quested rehearing. The appellate court, sitting en banc, reinstated
the district court's judgment,24 implying that New York state law
was inapplicable because the statute was designed to protect New
York citizens from attorneys of dubious qualifications who are un-
familiar with New York law.2" The plaintiff's qualifications were
undisputed, 8 and his activities were related solely to federal law.
The district judge had found that had the plaintiff moved for spe-
cial admission, there was no doubt that the request would have been
granted.2" Since such admission would have insulated the plaintiff
entirely from the effects of New York law, 8 the contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant was not an illegal bargain because
17 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 270.
18 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The
court explained:
It would seem that the "solitary incident" means a specific matter for one
client, as opposed to "a continuing course of conduct" to which the Court had
earlier referred. In context, it appears that the "continuing course of con-
duct" refers to representing a number of different clients in different matters
and thus approximating the normal activities of an admitted lawyer practicing
in New York. Ibid.
19 Id. at 18.
20 21 App. Div. 2d 348, 250 N.Y.S.2d 666, rev'd, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329,
263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
2 1 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 235 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
2 2 Spivak v. Sachs, 16 N.Y.2d 163, 211 N.E.2d 329, 263 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1965).
23 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 164-67 (2d Cir. 1966).
24 Id. at 168.
25 Id. at 164. (opinion of the panel).
26 judge Wyatt had "found that Spanos 'is well trained in law and is a member in
good standing of the California bar,' [and] that there was no suggestion of any unlawyer-
like conduct on his part." Id. at 168.
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 169.
19671 1357
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
it was capable of being performed lawfully.29 The defendant was
estopped from asserting the illegality of the bargain as a defense
because, by discharging the plaintiff, he had terminated the latter's
right to request special admission and had thus precipitated the il-
legality.30
Although this reasoning would have been sufficient to dispose
of the case, the court went on in dictum to state that under the priv-
ileges and immunities clause, no state can prohibit its citizens from
seeking the aid of an out-of-state attorney to give advice in conjunc-
tion with local counsel on a federal claim or defense."1 Reluctance
was expressed at thus increasing the incidents of national citizen-
ship; however, the court was convinced "that where a right has been
conferred on citizens by federal law, the constitutional guarantee
against its abridgment must be read to include what is necessary and
appropriate for its assertion." The present admission policy of
the district court was considered sufficient to assure this constitu-
tional guarantee:
The federal matter on which the help of a non-resident specialist
is sought may be pending in a different state or may not be a
suit at all, and specialized legal advice may be needed without the
delay or expense incident to admission by a federal court before
which the attorney may not have any intention of practicing, even
if that were available and would afford sufficient validation. 33
The court thus felt justified in dispensing with the necessity for spe-
cial admission.
The difficulty with the court's holding is that while it encour-
ages interstate federal practice, all control over such practice is ef-
fectively eliminated. Unless the court is willing to wait until a suit
for fees is brought before determining whether an attorney is quali-
fied to practice, both incompetents and experts must be treated
alike. Under the court's decision, an attorney need only be admitted
to the courts of his home state in order to practice in federal court.
It was apparently assumed that all states have high standards for
admission to practice and that such admission alone qualifies one to
advise on federal law. On the other hand, the present district court
rules recognize the great lack of uniformity of bar admission re-
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Id. at 170.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
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quirements from state to state."' Thus the court's assumption would
appear to have no basis in fact.
Moreover, although the present admission rules are aimed at
assuring federal litigants representation by attorneys of reasonably
high qualifications, the Spanos3 rule seems to thwart this objective
by permitting out-of-state attorneys to practice federal law with no
control by the federal courts whatsoever. Such a policy discrimi-
nates against local attorneys who are subject to more rigorous ad-
mission requirements and invites exploitation by migrant attorneys
who have made themselves unwelcome before their home bars.!'
A further difficulty presented by Spanos is the court's assump-
tion that federal law is an entity isolated from local law. This is
not generally true, as was recognized in Ginsburg v. Kovrak."7
There, the defendant was licensed to practice generally before sev-
eral Pennsylvania federal courts as well as the United States Su-
preme Court but had no license to practice in Pennsylvania."8 The
local bar association brought suit to enjoin him from practice in the
state courts of PennsylvaniaO9 The Pennsylvania court issued the in-
junction 0 and rejected the defense that the defendant practiced only
federal law, pointing out that in reality no clear distinction exists
between state and federal law; matters of due process and taxation
permeate all state law.4' Furthermore, in certain cases, pendant
jurisdiction42 could bring into federal court an actual state matter
when it is related to a federal cause of action. Thus, the distinction
34 This defidency was established in Application of Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213 (9th
Cir. 1956) in which the court stated:
T]he separate United States District Courts do not recognize a comity in
this regard [admissions] with each other or with the appellate courts. Each
is a separate tribunal governed by its own rules. Some... do not recognize
admission to the courts of the state in which they are situated as the test for
admission to their own bars.... Some... give general admission to lawyers
who are nonresidents of the state in which the ... Court sits. But there is no
requirement... that this be done. Id. at 215.
35 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966).
86 Application of Wasserman, 240 F.2d 214,216 (9th Cir. 1956).
37 139 A.2d 889 (Pa. C.P. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 893
(1958).
38 Id. at 890.
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 891-92.
41 Id. at 893.
42 When a federal court acquires jurisdiction over a federal question case where
diversity is lacking, it may dispose of the entire matter despite the fact that certain as-
pects of the case are purely matters for a state court to decide. See generally WniGHr,
op. cit. supra note 1, § 19.
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between state and federal law is not meaningful for the purpose of
delineating the limits of a law practice.
Analogizing to practice before the Patent Office may illustrate
the weaknesses of the Spanos" rule. In Sperry v. Florida ex rel.
Florida Bar,44 the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether
a state could enjoin the practice of a nonlawyer patent agent au-
thorized to practice by the Patent Office.45 Under state law the
practice was dearly prohibited."6 The Court held4" that Congress
had pre-empted state control by specifically authorizing such prac-
tice, and, more importantly, it was pointed out that the Patent Office
has the power to police the activities of such agents48 and that not
infrequently their expertise may become equal to that of a patent
attorney.4
9
It is clear that these factors were not present in the Spanos case.
The limits of patent practice are more easily determined because
the delineation between patent practice and nonpatent practice is
far sharper than that between state and federal practice. Further-
more, the Patent Office licenses patent agents, but under the Spanos
rule, an attorney needs no such explicit authority from a federal
court before he can act.
Because these countervailing arguments were disregarded, the
Spanos court apparently felt compelled to favor the policy of free
interstate law practice above all policies. The court emphasized
the need for eliminating barriers to the quick availability of expert
legal advice.5" In light of the facts in Spanos, this argument seems
most unpersuasive; it is hard to believe that during the course of a
five-year employment involving upwards of $100,000 in compen-
sation,5 an attorney should find it too inconvenient, time-consum-
ing, or expensive to obtain special admission to the federal district
court. Moreover, it does not seem reasonable to permit expediency
of interstate federal practice to so drastically undercut the state's
valid interest in prohibiting unauthorized practice.
43 Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966).
44 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
45 Id. at 381.
461 d. at 382-83.
47 Id. at 403.
48 Id. at 388-89.
49 Id. at 392.
50 This need is set forth in text accompanying note 33 supra.
51 The plaintiff actively participated in the litigation for this period of time and
for this amount. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 1966).
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Possible solutions to the problem must strike a balance between
the state's interest in protecting its citizens from the unauthorized
practice of law and the federal interest in the expeditious adminis-
tration of federal law. Presently, most federal courts solve the
problem through special admission. Such admission, however, is
not necessary until the attorney physically makes a court appear-
ance.52 Thus, both the present practice and the Spanos rule seem
to tip the balance too far in favor of the federal interest.
A solution proposed by one writer is a uniform state bar exam-
ination as a minimum prerequisite to law practice in each state."3
States could supplement the examination if they wished, but under
a uniform bar, a reciprocity would be established whereby all states
could be assured that an attorney had at least met certain minimum
standards. This solution seems to miss the mark. It fails to solve
the problem of attorneys who have changed their residence in order
to escape a bad reputation, and it fails to guarantee that an attorney
is well-trained in federal law. Furthermore, this solution contains
no assurance that an out-of-state attorney will be familiar with local
law.
A uniform federal bar examination would be little better. Such
an examination would be difficult to create, and few attorneys, not
to mention graduating law students, are familiar with all areas of
federal law. In addition, such a proposal also leaves unsolved the
problem of migratory attorneys and fails to assure familiarity with
local law.
In view of the shortcomings inherent in the various proposals,
the real solution lies in reform of the present system. Most of the
difficulty arises from the lack of uniformity in district court rules.
If special admission were permitted by all the federal district courts
and the procedures and requirements were uniform, as they would
be under the proposed uniform rule below,54 all parties concerned
52 Id. at 167.
58 See generally Coffman, A Uniform National Bar Examination, 23 ROCKY MT.
L. REV. 93 (1950).
54 The following is set forth as a suggested uniform rule:
A nonresident attorney not admitted to the courts of this state or district
and who acts as counsel in a particular transaction or case for a client within
this district shall be required to present himself before this court within the
first week after his arrival within this district on which this court is in session
and to offer an affidavit stating that he is admitted to practice and is in good
standing before the courts of the state or district wherein he resides and that
he has not been and is not now subject to disciplinary proceedings by the
courts or bar of any state or district. When this court is not in session, such
affidavit is to be filed along with written request for admission with the senior
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